The Region as Seen from the United States

By Interview with Michael Shifter
La Prensa (Bolivia), April 6, 2008

A Spanish version of this piece is available here.

A FRAGMENTED REGION

Overall, what is your opinion on current political and economic relations between South America and the United States?
 
Political relations between the U.S. and South America vary sharply from country to country, but for the most part they are not robust, especially compared with a dozen years ago. Washington is only selectively and sporadically interested in South America, and has shown considerable indifference towards the region. In the latest Andean crisis, for example, the United States played a secondary role at best. Many South Americans distrust the United States, mainly because of Iraq and other unpopular, unilateral global policies, but also because of its sometimes callous posture (Argentina’s financial crisis), confused, incoherent approach (Venezuela under Chávez) and failure to back an ally during a moment of great need (Bolivia 2002). Even Colombia, perhaps the U.S.'s strongest South American ally, is very frustrated with Washington because of the U.S. congress's opposition to a negotiated free trade agreement. Economic relations are better, largely because of a more favorable global environment over the past four years, but they could be even better if political obstacles did not stand in the way of more vital regional trade groups. There are also counterexamples. Ironically, U.S. trade has been impressively dynamic with Venezuela, also its main political adversary in South America.
 
How do you see regional integration in Latin America, especially in light of the recent international tensions, such as the fight over the paper mill, the border conflict between Colombia and Ecuador, confrontation between Venezuela and Colombia, the maritime dispute between Bolivia and Chile, etc.
 
Even leaving aside the United States, there is enormous political fragmentation and discord in South America. This is not a good moment for political integration, as seen in the Ibero-American summit in Santiago last November. It is true that trade and investment deals are being pursued and remittance and migratory flows have increased, but the political difficulties and tensions, which often revolve around economics or energy questions, are not abating. The strain between Argentina and Uruguay, two countries with seemingly like-minded governments, is striking. The good news is that the links in trade and energy between neighbors like Colombia and Venezuela are so profound that they serve as a buffer against a direct military confrontation. This effect was clearly demonstrated in the latest Andean crisis, which fortunately did not get out of control, partly also because regional bodies like the OAS and Rio group were in place to facilitate dialogue.
 
How do you see the Andean region in terms of regional integration, which has also faced challenges, including the crisis in the Andean Community (CAN)?

The Andean community was in deep trouble even before the latest crisis involving Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. When Chávez withdrew from the CAN after Colombia and Peru negotiated free trade deals with the United States, he aggravated an already strained Andean arrangement. It is hard to see how it can become effective without a basic level of mutual trust and broadly shared economic ideas.
 
With the internal problems in South America, both among members of Mercosur and the Andean Community, do you see a South American community as viable?
 
The South American community is an appealing idea for a variety of trade, security and diplomatic reasons. It no doubt reflects the aspirations of many in the continent. Still, for such a community to be successful and vital there needs to be a collective will to work together in pursuit of common goals. Right now, such a hope seems distant and elusive, in view of multiple political tensions and signs of renewed nationalism. Though an admirable, long-term aspiration, there are grounds to be skeptical that it can become a reality.
 
What changes are to be expected in the relationship between the United States and South America, with the possible election of John McCain? Could there be a break with the current policies under George W. Bush?
 
It is doubtful there will be any dramatic change in U.S. policy towards Latin America with any new administration, but even less so if john McCain is the next president. Though McCain is a maverick, who has been a leader in fighting for immigration reform and reduction of agricultural subsidies, he is unlikely to regard the region as a priority. His focus would be on Iraq. And he will also be forced to deal with the serious weaknesses of the U.S. economy, a subject McCain has largely avoided until now. McCain’s more progressive views on climate change and the use of torture (he was tortured as prisoner of war in Vietnam) might make him less of a lightening rod than bush.

MCCAIN, CLINTON Or OBAMA
 
How do you see the relationship between the United States and South America under one of the Democratic candidates, Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama?
 
It is striking how little difference there is on substantive issues between Clinton and Obama. Their positions on immigration and trade are hard to distinguish from one another. Changes in the us, and particularly the democratic party, point to growing anxiety about globalization and loss of U.S. jobs, which means either democratic candidate will probably be less committed to free trade deals in the region than either bush or McCain. Both, however, are likely to be more multilateral in their approach towards hemispheric affairs than the current administration has been.
 
How do you see these two candidates? The analysts in the region say Clinton is more conservative while Obama would be more progressive, leftist leader that could change the style of U.S. politics. Is that accurate?
 
In my view the conservative vs. Progressive or left distinction is not very helpful, especially in characterizing and comparing Clinton and Obama. Clinton may be more in line with the established way of practicing politics, and her government could be decidedly restorationist, an effort to return to some of the recipes and approaches used during her husband's administrations in the 1990s. In contrast, Obama promises a different kind of politics, less partisan and more conciliatory. Whether he would be able to deliver and move the country in such a direction is a big question, but there is the sense that at least he has the potential of being more transformational and setting a new tone, at home but especially in foreign policy, where the U.S. president has more leeway, than Clinton.

THE “POWER” OF HUGO CHÁVEZ
 
About Latin America, many say there is a leftist wave in the region with the elections of Chávez, Morales, Correa, Tabaré Vásquez, Rodríguez Zapatero, etc. What is your opinion? Are we seeing a resurgence of the Latin American left?
 
It is clear that in all Latin American countries, even those with governments not commonly considered of the "left," there is far greater emphasis than before on addressing the social agenda, and particularly the unacceptably wide gap between rich and poor. But since the end of the cold war, the "left" has really become an artificial construct and does not help illuminate underlying realities. The differences among the presidents and the governments they lead are so varied as to render the single, traditional, all-encompassing categories virtually meaningless. What, for example, does Chávez have in common with Lula? Their approaches toward economic and social policy, and relations with the U.S., could not be much further apart. True, both devote more attention to the poor, and seek greater distance from the U.S., but this is a broad political trend and response to regional realities more than an ideological affinity. And the way they pursue such goals are like night and day.
 
The discursive attacks between Bush and Chávez have not let up, including a recent threat to cut off Venezuelan oil to the United States. Is the United States worried that Latin America is moving against its expectations and interests?
 
The United States worries when it believes its interests are being challenged. That is currently the case in Venezuela, where the United States faces the dilemma of dealing with a government on which it depends for some 14% of oil imports but that has a markedly antagonistic, sometimes belligerent, relationship with Washington. The U.S. is mainly concerned about what he sees as Chávez’s ambitious regional, even global, agenda, which is driven by seeking to defy U.S. priorities and disrupt political and economic relations. It is also an agenda that, with oil at record prices, has a lot of money behind it. Venezuela is a special case, different from Bolivia and Ecuador, where the U.S. would like to see changes in policies in fighting drugs and treating foreign investors, but the level of concern regarding these situations is considerably lower.
 
How much power does Hugo Chávez have in the region? Some say Correa and Morales are his protégés. What are the implications of Chávez’s ideological and political connections?
 
There is no doubt some ideological affinity between Chávez on the one hand, and Correa and Morales on the other, and the Ecuadoran and Bolivian presidents are eager to benefit from Chávez’s largess. The relationships are marked by a mix of pragmatism and ideology. But there are real limits to such “tutelage” (if that is what it is), since it is unlikely that most Ecuadorans and Bolivians want decisions affecting their lives to be made in Caracas. There are also real economic and financial constraints, since oil production in Venezuela has dropped sharply and the government has made more promises than it can possibly meet. The control that Chávez exercises even over like-minded leaders like Correa and Morales is often overstated.
 
What is your opinion of Chávez’s Socialism for the 21st Century? How do you characterize Chávez’s policies and popularity in Venezuela, the region and the world, particularly in light of his support from Fidel Castro?
 
Chavez's version of socialism of the 21st century suffered a sharp repudiation in Venezuela, even among previous supporters, on December 2. I think that setback for Chávez was a real turning point. Venezuelans want expanded social programs, but they reject the idea of "president for life" and more autocratic rule. They are also increasingly dissatisfied with government performance in Venezuela, as soft spots such as inflation, crime and corruption take their toll. If Chávez’s model is not viable in Venezuela, where oil revenues give the government a chance to redistribute significant wealth, it is even less viable elsewhere. Latin Americans are searching for a new political path, but they have signaled Chávez’s 21st century socialism is not the answer. With the passing of Fidel Castro from the scene, the Venezuela/Cuba alliance will become increasingly tenuous. Cubans are fiercely nationalistic and will likely resist Venezuelan political interference and will strive to pursue an independent economic course.

BOLIVIA IN THE “AXIS OF EVIL”?

What is the perception of Bolivia in the United States and the political, economic and social reforms under Morales, especially since the U.S. government has classified this country as part of the “axis of evil”?
 
When Evo Morales was elected overwhelmingly as Bolivia's first indigenous president, there were mixed reactions in Washington. For many, his election was a significant breakthrough that held promise for overcoming sharp divisions and forging a coherent national identity and project. Others, however, were more skeptical, especially in view of Morales’s close ties with Chávez, his background in coca cultivation, and sometimes confrontational style. More moderate voices in the administration and congress have made a special effort to engage the Morales government with the extension of trade preferences and the millennium challenge corporation. Strain in the bilateral relationship is undeniable, but it is not accurate to say that the dominant view of Bolivia in Washington includes it as part of some "axis of evil."
 
How much does the alliance with Chávez affect the image of Bolivia in the United States?
 
There is no question that the alliance influences the image of Morales in the United States. Chavez, after all, is viewed as leading a coalition opposed to the United States, and Morales is seen as one of his chief allies. However, most policy makers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between the two leaders and also to understand that U.S. interests are very different in Venezuela and Bolivia.
 
What are the positive results of the Morales administration?
 
Fortunately, the worst fears about Bolivia under Morales have not been realized. Despite enormous conflicts and tensions, the country is pursuing its political and economic agenda, and Morales deserves credit for attempting to carry out his campaign promises and keeping his word. There has been lots of jockeying and posturing, but it seems like Bolivia is going to work out satisfactory terms for the development of its hydrocarbon sector with Brazil's Petrobras. The stalemate on the constitutional assembly has been troubling, but a positive result is still possible, depending on developments over the coming months.
 
How much can the United States twist the arms of leftist government with their economic pressure? For example, the ATPDEA has made Ecuador and Bolivia dependant on the North American market for tariff-free exports. Does the United States use this tool to influence the “anti-imperialist” governments? Can Chávez break this dependency on the United States?
 
It would be self-defeating and counterproductive for the U.S. to pressure Bolivia and try to influence its political stands by using ATPDEA as an instrument. Some members of congress may favor this approach, but most policymakers argue it would not accomplish very much, so it is unlikely to be applied. In addition to improving the Andean economy, ATPDEA is generally seen as a way to keep lines of communication open and provide an incentive for a workable relationship with the U.S. In the current context, and despite record high oil prices, it seems less and less likely that Chávez will be able to reduce the need for Ecuador and Bolivia to trade with the United States. Venezuela is in a unique position as a major world oil exporter but is still facing huge economic hurdles. Both Ecuadoran and Bolivian governments seem to realize they do not have the luxury to adhere to Chávez’s model and style of politics.