Advice for the Next US President

By Peter Hakim
O Estado de São Paulo Brazil, April 13, 2008

A Portuguese version of this op-ed is available here.

Even as Latin American views of the US have grown more positive in the past year, the quality of US relations with the nations of the region remains at a low ebb—as does US credibility and influence in regional affairs. To repair the damage, the next American president will need to substantially reverse the global policies of the Bush White House while, paradoxically, sticking closely to the Administration’s substantive agenda for Latin America.
 
No US president in memory has been more disliked in Latin American than George W. Bush. The distaste for the Bush Administration does not come mainly from its policies in Latin America. Instead, it mostly reflects Washington’s worldview and approach to global security. Most Latin Americas vehemently opposed the invasion of Iraq, and have been alienated by US unilateralism, militarism, and double standards. To regain Latin America’s trust, the next Administration will have to show greater respect for multilateral arrangements, use its military force more sparingly, and stop using torture (particularly while preaching about human rights).  Like most of the rest of the world, Latin Americans want the US to remove its troops from Iraq, stop threatening to invade Iran, and close down Guantanamo prison camp.
 
At the same time, however, the Bush Administration has, by and large, pursued a sensible agenda in the hemisphere—although much of it has been stymied by congressional and public opposition.  Most Latin American leaders would welcome efforts by a new US administration to press ahead with Bush’s unfinished agenda, particularly in the following half a dozen or so areas.
 
Trade Policies 
 
With hemispheric-wide free trade talks stalled, the White House has negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with ten Latin American nations. Two of these pacts (with Panama and Colombia) still await ratification by the US Congress.  The Panamanian accord will likely be approved soon after the leader of the nation’s lower house, who faces charges in the US for murder of an American soldier, leaves office later this year. It will be harder to secure approval of the Colombian agreement, which is staunchly opposed by US labor, by a large majority of Democrats in Congress, and by both contenders for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. Still, the next president should make the effort. Defeat of the Colombia FTA would humiliate the US’s most dependable South American ally and sharply diminish US credibility as a reliable economic partner.  
 
Trade preferences are less controversial than trade deals, but some congressional leaders are seeking to block tariff relief for countries that refuse to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements or that regularly express anti-US sentiments, like Bolivia and Ecuador. The Bush Administration has strongly supported these preferences, and so should a new administration. Ending them will alienate the countries involved and be considered needlessly punitive elsewhere.
 
 
Immigration reform
 
The comprehensive reform of US immigration policies was a top priority for the Bush Administration—as well as for Mexico and many other Latin American countries. Unfortunately, most elements of the reform were bitterly unpopular among the American public—and nothing has been done either to address the huge challenges presented by continuing waves of new immigration or by the 12 million people living in the US without any legal status. Changes in immigration law are supported by the three leading presidential candidates, but all of them have retreated from the expansive proposals they once advocated. The best that can be hoped for in the next few years, during a likely period of economic slowdown, are piecemeal efforts addressed to some of problems.
 
Security issues
 
Supported by the Clinton and Bush Administrations, Plan Colombia has made some $5 billion in anti-drug, anti-guerrilla assistance available to the Colombian government. It has succeeded in substantially bolstering the authority of the government, and making the country safer and more secure (although it has not reduced drug flows to the US or ended human rights abuses). Despite its accomplishments, Colombia will continue to require US security aid for some years into the future.  
 
This year the Bush White House negotiated the so-called Merida Initiative with Mexico to support collaboration between the two countries (and with Central American nations) to address shared problems of drug trafficking and criminal violence. This collaboration should remain a high priority for the next president—who ideally should consider expanding it to other countries confronting critical problems of public safety. 
 
The Bush Administration has built a constructive relationship with the Lula government in Brazil. The two countries are not active partners on most issues (even the heralded ethanol agreement signed by Lula and Bush has not produced much), but they share many basic interests and values. When they cooperate almost every other country in the region joins in. When they do not, the hemisphere usually remains divided. To sustain this fundamental relationship, the next administration in Washington needs to follow Bush’s lead in acknowledging Brazil’s expanding regional and global influence, respecting its independent foreign policy, and accommodating its disagreements with the US. 

The Bush Administration started out mishandling relations with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. An openly confrontational US government ended up elevating Chavez’s profile and influence, while Latin America governments bristled at US pressure to publicly oppose Chavez. And they deplored Washington’s celebration of the short-lived coup against Chavez in 2002. But for the past several years, Bush has moderated its responses to the antics and threats of Chavez, and stopped pressing other countries to restrict relations with Venezuela. That is the best approach for the next president to follow.
 
Cuba is one issue on which the Bush Administration has been conspicuously out of step with Latin America. Nearly every government in the region maintains normal relations with Havana, and would loudly applaud a reversal of long-standing US efforts to isolate Cuba. The politically powerful Cuban-American community has played a central role in blocking liberalization of US Cuba policy to date, and will remain a formidable influence in shaping the next president’s approach to the island. None of the US presidential candidates has yet dared to advocate a new Cuba policy.  Still, the next US president could and should quickly signal a shift in direction, for example, by scrapping the barriers to travel to Cuba, starting with the limits on Cuban Americans, and calling for a review of the Helms-Burton legislation, which punishes other countries for trading with Cuba. US policy, however, is likely to evolve only gradually, and changes will require continuing Cuba-American support and reciprocal actions by the Havana government.
 
To conclude: The best way for the next US president to begin to rebuild trust and credibility in Latin America is to pursue President Bush’s unfinished agenda for the region—for example, by getting the Colombian and Panamanian trade deals ratified, taking a few constructive steps toward immigration reform, establishing new cooperative security programs with Mexico and Central America, and sustaining good US relations with Brazil.  There is just not much demand today for any major new hemispheric initiatives from Washington—not in the US, with its growing anti-globalist mood and painful economic situation, nor in Latin America, where governments increasingly prefer to deal with their own regional problems.