Violent Mexico

By Peter Hakim
El Universal, March 28, 2009

Una versión de este artículo está disponible en español aquí.

Mexico has the attention of the Obama Administration, although not in a way anyone in would have liked. In the next few weeks, President Obama and three US cabinet secretaries—Hillary Clinton, Eric Holder, and Janet Napolitano—will be paying visits Mexico City. All of them have the central purpose of figuring out what to do about the relentless surge of crime and violence now confronting our Southern neighbor, and the massive drug and arms trafficking that fuels it. The focus is correct. Besides the devastating impact on Mexico, this exceptionally brutal crime wave threatens the US in myriad ways. But, when they sit down with their Mexican counterparts, the US leaders must be clear about what it will take to restore law and order to Mexico.

To start with, they need to understand that the spreading criminality and lawlessness is primarily Mexico’s problem, even though it is mainly caused by US drug purchases and arms sales and cannot be solved without US help. For one thing, Mexico will end up paying a far greater price than the US if the violence is not contained. Yes, there will be costs for the US—economic losses, spillover threats to public safety, expanding drug flows, heightened migration pressures, and the long-term burdens of having a lawless and unstable country as a neighbor. But for Mexico the price is much, much higher. Its future success as a nation may be at risk.

It is also largely Mexico’s problem because that country will have to do most of the work to fix it. It is Mexican officials, police, army troops, judges, prosecutors, and many others that will bear the brunt of the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking. And Mexico will have to provide most of the money to pay for it. The US can and should contribute what it can—by expanding the Merida initiative, the Mexico-US cooperative anti-drug, anti-crime program, and by curbing weapons smuggling, doing more to stop money laundering, and reducing drug demand on this side of the border.

Second, it should be understood that this is a problem Mexico shares with other nations. Mexico is only one of many Latin American countries plagued by drug-fueled crime and violence, and it is by no means the worst off. Mexico’s institutions are stronger, more competent, and less vulnerable than those of many Central American and Caribbean nations. Mexico has far more resources, human and financial, to put into the fight against crime. The prospect of state failure or state capture by organized crime is much greater in those nations than in Mexico, as is the likelihood of continuing violent confrontations between their governments and outlaws over many years.

It would be a mistake for the US to concentrate attention exclusively on Mexico. Unless a genuinely regional approach is developed, success in Mexico will spread the narco-trafficking routes, along with the crime and violence, across Central America and the Caribbean. In fact, the greater the success in Mexico, the greater the danger to nearby countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, which are already being overrun by crime.

Ironically, it was this so-called “balloon effect” that gave the drug trade its foothold in Mexico—when President George H.W. Bush managed to curtail trafficking through the Caribbean.

Third, no matter how urgent it is for the US and Mexico to deal with drugs and organized crime, the two nations’ agenda cannot be reduced to that problem alone. Disregarding the common economic challenges, neglecting joint action on environmental issues, ignoring the deep discord over immigration and trade policies will all make US-Mexican cooperation on security matters more difficult and less effective. It will also diminish opportunities for the US to help shore up, on many fronts, the authority and capacity of the Mexican government, which is critical to the fight against lawlessness.  The US-Mexican relationship is extraordinarily rich and complex. It should not be condensed to a single issue, no matter how urgent or important..

Right now, what is most important to Mexico is the pace of US economic recovery and how we assist Mexico through its economic recession. It is imperative that the US avoid protectionist measures that place barriers on US imports from Mexico (like the ban on Mexican trucks), limit US investments in Mexico, curb legal immigration, or interfere with remittance flows. The US should do what it can to help Mexico obtain essential financing—through the IMF and multilateral development banks or  special credit arrangements with the US government  (like the $30 billion dollar swap the US provided Mexico last year—along with Brazil, Korea, and Singapore).

Finally, the threats from organized crime in Mexico should not be exaggerated. Mexico’s democratic system is not imperiled by criminal activity nor are the country’s public institutions at risk.  Mexico is not in danger of becoming a failed state. Alarmist interpretations of developments in Mexico—which have been advanced by US military and intelligence agencies—are becoming increasingly commonplace. They may well lead to misguided policy prescriptions and make it harder for the US and Mexico to cooperate on security matters—or any other issues.  Mexico is going through an extremely difficult period, but the problems and alternative solutions require careful and intelligent assessment, not fearmongering.