Restoring Democratic Rule in Honduras
By Peter Hakim
Infolatam, July 14, 2009
Una versión de este articulo en español está disponible aquí
No one—or at least no one outside of Honduras—seemed to think it would be very hard to reverse that country’s recent military coup that sent President Manuel Zelaya into exile. Every Western Hemisphere government (and governments worldwide) swiftly condemned the coup, and called for Zelaya’s immediate return to power. How could Honduras, one of Latin America’s smallest and poorest countries, resist? The US, which joined the anti-coup consensus, was supposed to be particularly influential with the Honduran military and the new, de facto government.
And when the new authorities rejected their demands to restore Zelaya, the hemisphere’s governments imposed a series of unusually harsh sanctions on Honduras. It became the only country other than Cuba ever suspended by the Organization of American States (remarkably only weeks after Cuba’s 47-year old suspension had been lifted). The World Bank and Inter-American Development ceased lending, Venezuela cut off its considerable assistance programs, and three neighboring countries closed their land borders. The US put its aid programs under review.
But, contrary to expectations, all this made the de facto government even more defiant. A Venezuelan government plane carrying Zelaya back to Honduras was prevented from landing and diverted to El Salvador. Sadly, two pro-Zelaya demonstrators were shot and killed protesting at the airport. It had become apparent that the Honduran authorities would not yield to international pressure. The coup, in fact, would not be reversed quickly or easily.
It was the US and the hemisphere’s other governments that had to change course. After meeting with Zelaya in Washington, Secretary Clinton turned to Nobel Laureate and President of Costa Rica Oscar Arias to mediate between the deposed President Zelaya and Honduras’s de facto government led by Roberto Micheletti.
Although it is early to draw any definitive lessons from these events, a few preliminary conclusions are worth considering.
First, it is relatively easy to assert the basic principle that military coups are an assault on democracy that cannot be allowed to stand—although the US and Latin American nations have certainly not always done that. Still, what can and should be done in a given situation depends not on principles alone but also on the political context and its particular dynamics. In this case, the OAS and its member governments underestimated how intensely Honduras’s political leadership opposed Zelaya. And how much they feared he would find a way to extend his term of office and push the country fully into Venezuela’s orbit. With some justification, he was viewed by many as the culprit responsible for provoking the coup, not as its victim. All this made the new authorities unbending in their resistance to his return. In addition, it was clear that Zelaya could not simply pick up where he left off. The coup had changed Honduran politics.
Second, negotiations, not threats or ultimatums, are the best approach to addressing a political confrontation of the kind that has emerged Honduras—although they may only be possible after a period of stalemate. Compromise is difficult when one or both sides believe they can get all they want. Excluding de facto President Micheletti and military leaders from early, post-coup discussions with OAS and US leaders was probably a mistake. Along with the imposition of sanctions, it may have delayed a solution. Following the 1991 coup in Haiti, hemispheric governments maintained communication with the country’s new military authorities, although it hardly sped President Aristides return to power, which was delayed for three years. And Aristide was popular in Haiti. Negotiations with President Fujimori after he closed down the Peruvian congress and courts led to some concessions. Turning to President Arias to mediate the crisis in Honduras may now open the way to a settlement. The clashing, irreconcilable demands of Zelaya and Micheletti should not be viewed as particularly troubling at this point. Negotiations always start out with the parties in dispute laying out their initial, often extreme, bargaining positions; the concessions and compromises come later.
Third, the defense of democracy requires multilateralism—which is what legitimizes intrusion into the political affairs of a sovereign nation. The US obtained the authorization of the UN for its intervention in Haiti to restore Aristide to power in 1994. But effective multilateralism does not simply mean turning the job over to the UN or the OAS. It requires the US and other governments to sustain an active and continuing involvement in the multilateral process and to engage bilaterally in constructive ways. For a few days in Honduras, the US, along with such countries as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, appeared to taking a time out—while Venezuela and its allies were energetically, if a bit chaotically, pressing to get Zelaya back, regardless of the dangers. Only Canada took an early and strong public position against the immediate return of Zelaya. Secretary Clinton’s subsequent initiative to promote the Arias-mediated negotiations between President Zelaya and the de facto Honduran government was a welcome and needed form of US engagement.
Finally, there is no doubt that reversing a coup d’état and restoring a democratically elected leader is an important and principled objective. But it cannot be the only objective. It must be balanced against such other goals as averting bloodshed and moderating political tensions and polarization that can undermine longer term prospects for democratic rule and social peace. In Honduras, the immediate return of Zelaya threatened both violence and deeper political conflict. It is now essential to insure that the country’s next presidential election, scheduled in November, is not only free and fair, but also widely credible in the Honduran population. That may be more important for building democracy and the rule of law in Honduras than reversing the coup.