The Meaning of Honduras

By Peter Hakim
Revista América Economía, August 27, 2009

 

THE MEANING OF HONDURAS
Peter Hakim

Click here for version in Spanish.

Since June 28th when President Zelaya was forcibly sent into exile, Honduras has been at the center of hemispheric relations. Across the political spectrum, the Honduran crisis is viewed as a critical test for the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. It has also become a measuring rod for the hemisphere’s commitment to democracy and a challenge to the Obama administration’s efforts to pursue a more cooperative, multilateral policy in Latin America. Among the important issues at stake are:

Was the ouster of Zelaya a military coup or a legal transfer of power?
Although there is no widely-accepted definition of a coup d’état, what happened in Honduras, by almost any standard, can be called a coup. To be sure, Zelaya bears a heavy responsibility for the events leading to his ouster, and both the Supreme Court and Congress have declared his removal justified. Still, when an elected president, without formally being charged with a crime and without the opportunity to face his accusers, is taken away by military forces in the middle of the night, and sent to another country, it is hard to argue that that anything other than a coup has taken place.

No, it was not your classic coup. The military did not assume power, even for a brief period. The presidency was immediately turned over to the constitutionally designated successor, and regularly scheduled presidential elections remain on track for this year. In contrast, the Brazilian military held power for 21 years; General Pinochet was president for 17.

Will events in Honduras spark coup attempts elsewhere?
Not likely. Military coups are today extremely rare in Latin America. With few exceptions, elected leaders—even those who lose popular support—complete their terms. Democratic values are increasingly rooted in Latin America and elections have become the only legitimate route to power. Interestingly, the prime motivation for the Democratic Charter, approved in 2001, was not to prevent coups—but to keep elected leaders (then exemplified by Peru’s President Fujimori) from breaching constitutional limits on their power.  Moreover, hemispheric governments have responded forcefully to the Honduran crisis. Every government condemned the coup, demanded the return of Zelaya, and endorsed Honduras’s suspension from the OAS. With economic sanctions taking effect and the country’s politics deeply polarized, Honduras is paying a high price for ousting an elected leader.

Have the OAS and the Democratic Charter been discredited?
Hardly. Despite the unanimous agreement of all 33 member countries, the OAS could not quickly reverse the coup. The fact is, however, that the OAS has never taken a stronger position in defense of democracy—and never before have OAS members coalesced sufficiently to bring the Charter into play.  That consensus remains strong after two months of frustrated efforts to reverse the coup. Sure, the Honduran crisis has demonstrated weaknesses in the OAS and the Charter that need correction, but it has also shown that the hemisphere’s governments, despite their differences, are capable of multilateral initiative.

Has Venezuela and its allies been strengthened or weakened?
Probably neither. With the ouster of Zelaya, Hugo Chavez lost an ally, but not an important or enduring one. In return, Chavez gained a new stage for his theatrics and a re-energized argument about the anti-democratic tendencies of Latin America’s traditional leaders. In the days after the coup, Venezuela appeared to be driving OAS efforts to restore Zelaya. But now, the more moderate governments of Brazil, Chile and Mexico, along with the U.S., have taken the lead and turned to a strategy of negotiation rather than threats and ultimatums. Still, Chavez maintains his capacity for disruption, which may increase with the rising oil prices

What has Honduras revealed about President Obama’s hemispheric policy?
By joining the consensus response of the hemisphere’s governments to the Honduran coup (and earlier the consensus on Cuba’s reentry to the OAS), the Obama Administration demonstrated its preference for multilateral approaches to regional issues and its interest in more closely aligning US and Latin American agendas. Events since June 28, however, have demonstrated how difficult it will be for the US to pursue that course—given the polarizing politics of Washington, the ideological divisions in Latin America, and the region’s reflexive suspicion of US motives.

Many in the US and Latin American view the Honduran crisis as a clear sign the US has lost respect and influence. Certainly in their view, the US should have known about preparations for the coup and been able to prevent it—or, at least by now, should have succeeded in convincing the de facto authorities to turn the government back to Zelaya. Others see the US as unprincipled—either it is not doing enough to restore the elected president or it should be solidly backing the new government which protected Honduras from a Chavez ally. Obama will not be able to satisfy everyone, and may end up satisfying no one.